

Until very recently, many studies dealing with the state of Israel have ignored the role of Islam in Israeli religious, social, cultural, and political life. This situation changed, however, with the development of the Israeli Islamic movement in the 1980s, a movement which has continued to evolve and expand within the Muslim population of the Israeli-Arabs.¹ The Islamic movement in Israel, while unique, shares many features with the Islamic revival movements that have occurred in other countries in that it can be characterized as a reaction to a variety of broadly similar historical, political, and cultural factors. What makes the movement unique, however, is nature of the Israeli state, the place of Israeli-Arabs in it, and the relationship of the Israeli-Arabs and their Islamic movement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An analysis of these factors is essential to understanding the identity of the Muslim Israeli-Arabs and the features of their Islamic movement. An examination of the Islamic movement's role in daily society, the Al Aqsa Intifada, and the 2003 Israeli Knesset elections, will demonstrate that, while this movement will continue to grow in strength among Israeli-Arabs, it will test the limits of Israeli's commitment to maintaining a democratic, Zionist state.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Islam and Palestine

The area known as Palestine has been important to the religion of Islam since its inception. For the Prophet Mohammad, Jerusalem was the home of the prophets. Prior to the seizure of Mecca in 632 AD, Muslims turned to face Jerusalem when reciting their daily prayers. Jerusalem is also mentioned or referred to in a number of Koranic *suras* and in *hadiths* containing the sayings and actions of the Prophet. Most notably, the Prophet was miraculously taken to Jerusalem during his *isra* (night journey) and ascended (*mi'raj*) from there to heaven where he received instruction in how to pray from Moses.² Given the important place of Jerusalem in Islamic theology and its close proximity the Arabian Peninsula, it was only natural that Islam would expand westward. In 637 AD, Caliph Umar I captured Jerusalem and proceeded to expand Islam's growing empire through Palestine to the Mediterranean and across the Sinai to Egypt.³

Today's Israeli-Arabs and Palestinians "are in their majority the descendants of those who lived in the country since time immemorial."⁴ While sharing common cultural and social traits with Arabs, the people of the southern Levant were considered ethnically unique prior to the spread of Islam. Over time, they developed an Arab ethnicity due to their adoption of Arab language, traditions, and Islam. Islam's appeal to the people of Palestine most likely stemmed

from the lack of factionalism in Islam, the simplicity of the Islamic faith, the dominance of the Arab elite, and the lower tax burden associated with being a Muslim.⁵

In 691 AD construction was completed on the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem to commemorate the Prophet's miraculous journey and ascension. Jerusalem was considered by Islam to be the third holiest place on earth, behind Mecca and Medina. While various dynasties ruled the area of Palestine up until the end of World War I, Islam did not face a serious challenge in this area until the Crusades, which occurred between 1095 to 1300, and the Mongols, who were forestalled in 1260.⁶ Despite these incursions, Islam and Islamic dynasties remained the dominant, unifying force for the people in this area up through the modern period.

The Roots of Palestinian Nationalism

The fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I raised expectations in the Arab world that independence was at hand. The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1918, between Great Britain and France, dashed those hopes of independence and divided the Levant into two mandates. The French gained control of Lebanon and Syria and the British took control of Palestine and Jordan. The Arabs in Palestine had expected they would be part of an independent state of "Greater Syria" but they soon realized this was a forlorn hope. Largely in reaction to the British and their support for the Zionists, who sought to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a Palestinian nationalist movement formed in 1918 and it developed widespread appeal throughout the 1920s.⁷ In 1921, 1929, and from 1936-1939 (the period known as the "Arab revolt") Palestinians rioted and engaged in violent clashes with the British and the Zionists. Although these were conflicts between Muslims, Christians, and Jews, religion was not an overt dimension in the Palestinian cause. Principally, the Palestinians resented the significant influx of Ashkenazi immigrants from Europe. Their resentment primarily stemmed from the Zionist's land acquisition policy, their increasingly dominant role in the Palestinian economy, their condescending attitudes toward all Orientals, and the favoritism showed to the Zionists by the British.⁸ The Palestinians most often cited political, economic, and cultural factors as their main grievances. The political and violent expressions of Palestinian nationalist fervor were not controlled by religious leaders but by the heads of various clans or secular political movements, those who felt most threatened by the loss of power caused by Jewish immigration and British colonial policies.⁹

The 1936-1939 revolt was a watershed event in the history of the Palestinian nationalist movement. The event which precipitated the revolt was the death of Shaykh Izz al-Din al Qassam, a popular leader who "advocated Arab unity and independence for Palestine" and was killed in a British ambush in November of 1935.¹⁰ The revolt began

with a general strike and, over the course of the three year revolt, there were a number of violent clashes as the British clamped down on the movement. The revolt was a boon to the Jewish immigrants, who filled the jobs left by the Arabs; increasing the overall prosperity of the Jewish people relative to the Palestinians. While the revolt served to crystallize the Palestinian nationalist movement, it ultimately failed due to British pressure, which forced many of the movement's leaders into exile. The movement declined in strength as factions within it, mainly drawn along clan lines, sought control over the nationalist cause. Additionally, leaders in exile focused more on maintaining their power base within Palestine than cooperating with each other or articulating a unified Palestinian nationalist vision to the larger Arab community.¹¹ What the Palestinians lacked – unity, funding, and support from powerful nations in the international community – the Zionists had in relative abundance and they used these advantages to gain their principal objective, the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The Origin of the Israeli-Arabs

While tensions in Palestine continued through the World War II period, they would not erupt with the same vehemence again until the establishment of Israel in 1948. Following the war, factors – such as guilt over the Holocaust; extensive Jewish lobbying; the sense, by predominantly Christian nations, such as the U.S., that the Jewish peoples' right to a homeland was biblically justified; and British desires to divest themselves of Palestine – led, in 1947, to United Nations (UN) Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Palestine into separate Zionist and Palestinian areas of control.¹² The plan was rejected by the Palestinians and the Arab world, who soon mobilized forces to secure their control of the region. The Jewish army, well organized and well equipped, swiftly defeated the two main Arab armies and secured the initial boundaries of the Israeli state in May of 1948.¹³ This event, is known to the Palestinians as *al-Nakba* (the tragedy), not only because of their military defeat but because the Palestinians lost their opportunity to form a state. Many were evicted or fled from the area under Israeli control, an area they had lived in for generations. While Arabs remained in control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where a majority of the Palestinians eventually settled, these areas were annexed by Jordan and Egypt, respectively, preventing the Palestinians from forming their own state. Many of those who left Israel were among the Palestinian tribal, economic, and intellectual elite. The remaining 150,000 Palestinians were shocked, demoralized, and virtually leaderless, except on a local level, in the period immediately following the Zionists' victory.¹⁴ The impact of the Israeli victory and the Palestinian diaspora on the Palestinians left in Israeli was significant. They were now "Israeli-Arabs," – Muslims, Christians, and Druze – all Israeli citizens in a Zionist state. For the Muslims, even those not particularly devout, this was a watershed event in the

formation of their identity. As Sammy Smooha, who has conducted a multi-year study on the Israeli-Arabs and their relationship to Israel, characterizes their situation, these Israeli-Arabs were now in “[t]he anomalous position of ... a subordinate minority in a Jewish state...living as subordinates in *waqf* land (which was liberated by Islam and destined to be ruled by Moslems) under the Jews, a people traditionally subject to a Moslem rule.”¹⁵

THE ISRAELI-ARABS AND THE ISRAELI STATE

Many recent works of scholarship analyzing the rise of political Islam have noted similar patterns in the rise of Islamic revival movements throughout the Muslim world. These revival movements are primarily seen as reactions to a number of common features that are endemic in the developing world such as – questions concerning governmental legitimacy, reaction to authoritarian rule, lack of equality and opportunity, disruptions caused by rapid modernization, and a state’s Islamic policy. The course of events leading to the Islamic resurgence in each country has also followed broad familiar patterns – following independence, a political elite takes power and establishes a secular state built on a quasi-Western style of government, an intellectual elite or another political group forms in opposition, usually due to failure of expectations raised in the wake of independence. In Islamic countries, some of these opposition groups were secular in nature but the more successful movements, successful in terms of establishing grass-roots support and providing a real challenge to the government, were predominantly Islamic.¹⁶ The rise of the Islamic movement in Israel, interestingly, follows a path similar to the one outlined above for the Islamic countries, despite the fact Israel is a Western-oriented, democratic, and Zionist state. By looking at various aspects of the Israeli state and its response to its Arab minority, it will become clear that the Islamic movement in that country is motivated by many of the same issues that inspired similar movements in other countries.

Israeli-Arabs: Citizens in an “Ethnic Democracy”¹⁷

Elia Zureik’s groundbreaking study, *The Palestinians in Israel*, characterizes the unique nature of democracy in Israel by stating that “Israel is not the state of its citizens, in the Western sense, but rather ‘the sovereign state of the Jewish people’. The legal and institutional structure of the state...reflect this fundamental commitment to discrimination – what we would call ‘racism’ in discussing any other society.”¹⁸ While some may dispute that characterization, numerous studies have clearly demonstrated that Israel’s policies toward its Arab minority have been

discriminatory; despite the fact Israeli-Arabs are full citizens who can vote, participate in elections, have the rights of free speech, assembly, and religion, and who live in a state that largely respects the rule of law.¹⁹ Although the trend has been toward greater democratization, in the Western sense, and improved standards of living for the Israeli-Arabs, recent studies show that, while Israeli-Arabs may have *jinsiyya* (“passport citizenship”), they still do not possess *muwatana* (“democratic citizenship”). They may possess equal civil and political rights with the Israeli majority but they are unequal in their social and economic rights.²⁰ A brief review of the political, economic, and social development of the Israeli-Arabs will demonstrate that the conditions of inequality, discrimination, and lack of opportunity, which are cited as major factors in the development of Islamic movements elsewhere, have existed and continue to exist in Israel.

After Israel’s victory in 1948, the remaining Arab population was in a state of political disarray. Israel’s response to the presence of 150,000 Palestinians in its territory was to set up a system of military rule in the areas with large concentrations of Arabs. The Israeli-Arabs were largely treated as potential threats and their civil and political rights were highly circumscribed.²¹ Over time, government policies liberalized and Arabs formed political parties, most of which espoused either communist or secular nationalist goals. The most prominent of these was al-Ard, which advocated a nationalist platform, essentially desiring the establishment of a Palestinian state along the lines of the partition plan from UN Resolution 181. Although initially allowed to operate freely, following a 1962 Israeli Supreme Court decision in its favor, al-Ard was eventually disbanded in 1967 as the government perceived it to be a threat.²² By the 1970s, Israeli-Arabs became more of a political force in Israel when, in 1977, Likud ended the Labor Party’s dominance of Israeli politics. The Israeli-Arabs were courted by various parties, who needed Israeli-Arab votes to gain seats in the Knesset. Some parties also included Israeli-Arabs on their slate of candidates. By the late 1980s, Arab parties began to form, first making gains locally and then transitioning to national politics.²³ Despite these positive developments, Israeli-Arabs remain in an unequal status politically, due to a Knesset election law, which makes it illegal for any political party to advocate “negation of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people.” As Yoav Peled and Shafir Gershon characterize their political situation, the Israeli-Arabs have “individual liberal rights but [they are] forbidden to advance a collective vision of the common good of society that would be incompatible with the Zionist vision.”²⁴ Israeli-Arab political rights are also under assault from right-wing Zionist groups, who increasingly play a pivotal role in the Israeli government as evidenced by the last two Knesset elections.²⁵

The disparity between the Israeli-Arab standard of living and that of the majority also point to systematic economic discrimination that has occurred since the beginning of the Israeli state. Although they enjoy a higher

standard of living than most other Arabs, the Israeli-Arabs are a disadvantaged minority in Israel. One reason for this is the Israeli policy of land confiscation, which began shortly after the establishment of Israel. Any Palestinian who was “absent” from their lands, whether internally or externally displaced, was subject to having their lands confiscated and turned over to the state.²⁶ The policy created a situation whereby Israeli-Arabs are “legally excluded from 92 percent of the territory of the State of Israel, which remains classified by law for ‘Jewish only’ settlement, cultivation, and development.”²⁷ Additionally, up until very recently, Israeli-Arabs were often denied the right to expand their enclaves due to strict zoning laws, this despite the fact the Israeli-Arab population increased nearly ten-fold from 1948 to the present. If new construction is attempted without the proper permits, these structures are often razed by the Israelis.²⁸ In addition to the land policy, economic disparity was further exacerbated by a lack of development funding for Israeli-Arab areas, which forced many Israeli-Arabs to take low wage, menial jobs in Jewish sectors that are often far from their villages.²⁹ In 1993, Israeli-Arabs made approximately 72 percent of the income of a comparable Jewish family and, as recently as November 2002, a government report showed that 41.3 percent of Israeli-Arabs live in poverty as opposed to 17.5 percent of the Jewish population. The study also showed the budget for Arab development was only 6.5 percent of the entire Israeli development budget.³⁰

In addition to political and economic discrimination, Israeli-Arabs are also subject to social discrimination, which has its roots in the wave of Ashkenazi immigration that took place throughout the 20th century. Most Ashkenazi looked on the natives of Palestine, both Arab and Jew, as culturally backward and inferior. To deal with this situation a goal of the Israeli state was rapid modernization, which was seen as a means of assimilating the population.³¹ Over time, this emphasis on modernity eventually had an impact on the Israeli-Arabs who, for the most part, assimilated some Israeli (Western) societal norms, evidenced by their declining fertility rates and their attitudes toward women. While their social services and educational opportunities were less than those afforded to the Israeli majority, Israeli-Arabs still benefited from greater access to these services than did their counterparts in most other Arab countries.³² Despite these trends, social equality remains a reality for only a small percentage of the Israeli-Arabs. Studies indicate most Israelis do not socialize with Israeli-Arabs and the image of coexistence is largely illusory. The Jewish population’s reaction to Israeli-Arab support for the al-Aqsa Intifada – unofficial boycotts by Jews of Arab stores and restaurants, calls by some right-wing Jewish student groups to deny Israeli-Arabs access to technical studies (since these skills could be used to make terrorist weapons), and censorship of a prominent Israeli-Arab Islamic newspaper – are just a few of the indicators of the distrust that still exists between the two groups.³³ Israeli-Arab Knesset Member (MK) 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Darawishah has compared the situation of the Israeli-Arabs in Israel to that of the Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland,

stating the Israeli-Arabs “live in Arab societies inside Israel that are almost isolated from the Jewish society and even in mixed cities there are Arab ghettos that are not assimilated in the Israeli society.”³⁴

As a religion, Islam places strong emphasis on socioeconomic equality and justice. In the minds of many Israeli-Arabs, the State of Israel has failed to produce either of these qualities in its society and, while there has been gradual improvement in the conditions under which Israeli-Arabs live, they are still treated as second-class citizens when it comes to sharing the fruits of Israel’s democracy and its economic prosperity. Similar conditions have occurred in many countries of the developing world, where social and economic inequality, coupled with the lack of a suitable political outlet to effect change, has led to popular movements that seek to change conditions, at least on a local level. In Islamic countries, that response has typically been a return to an Islamic fundamentalism. This same developmental trend is also present in the rise of Israel’s Islamic Movement.

Israeli-Arabs: Response to Modernization

Israel’s emphasis on modernization, which was seen by the Zionists as a means of assimilating disparate groups into society, is another factor in the development of political Islam in Israel. Through the late 1970s, Israeli schools emphasized Ashkenazi history and culture, devoting relatively few hours to Arab history and culture, even in schools located primarily in Israeli-Arab areas.³⁵ While the intent was to aid in society’s integration, the result has been quite different. As with many countries in the developing world, rapid modernization has caused a sense of dislocation among indigenous peoples as everything from the pace of their lives to their types of work and their choices for entertainment undergoes a dramatic shift. The reaction to this sense of dislocation is often a return to traditional ways of life as a means of inducing stability back into their existence.³⁶ This strong reaction to modernism has parallels in the experience of many countries where Islamic revival movements have flourished. Interestingly, this counter-modernization phenomenon is not limited to the Muslims in Israel. It has also been attributed as a major factor in the inability of the Israeli state to fully assimilate the Sephardic Jews, who share many socio-economic similarities with the Israeli-Arabs, and the growing popularity of ultra-orthodox strands of Judaism in Israel.³⁷

Israeli Islamic Policy

One of the foundations of the Israeli state has been its commitment to freedom of religion. Since there is no differentiation between church and state in Islam, the Israeli government has had to intervene in areas of Islam that have a political or social dimension, which has created tensions with the Muslim community in Israel. In many ways, the

Israeli response to Islam resembles that adopted by other Muslim nations, like Nasser's Egypt, in that there is an "official" Islam that has a degree of state control. The state uses its control to promote a "traditional" (apolitical) form of Islam. Since it is beholden to the state for survival, this state-sponsored form of Islam is often seen as a tool of the state and, consequently, it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of some of the *umma*.³⁸ One element of Islam in Israel that is firmly under the control of the state is system of *shari'a* courts, which, like in Turkey, have a proscribed authority that limits their influence to matters of Islamic faith and family law. The *qadis* who preside over these courts, who constitute the highest level of Muslim officials in Israel, are paid by the state and must swear an oath of allegiance to it. They are appointed by the President of Israel, who bases his decisions on the recommendations of an advisory group made up of Muslims and non-Muslims.³⁹ The appointment of *imams* to state sponsored mosques is managed by the Ministry of Religions, once again, a non-Islamic body that makes decisions on an issue of significant importance to most practicing Muslims. The perception exists within the Islamic community in Israel that the appointment of *qadis* and *imams* is based more on a particular individual's political connections or beliefs and less on their knowledge of Islam and Islamic law.⁴⁰

Two other issues important to the Muslims in Israel are religious education and the administration of the *waqf*, or charitable religious endowments. As previously mentioned, Israeli-Arab schools have predominantly focused on Jewish issues, to include issues of religion. To address rising Israeli-Arab concerns about this disparity, the Israeli government has instituted some reform measures that have given the Israeli-Arabs a greater voice in determining the curriculum in the state-sponsored schools in their communities. Since 1990, schools in Israeli-Arab areas have made some progress in instituting curriculums with a greater focus on Islamic and Arab issues, however; the reforms have not met the expectations of some in the Israeli-Arab community.⁴¹ Like the education issue, the *waqf* issue has its roots in the establishment of the Israeli state and is directly related to Israeli land policy. The Israeli policy of acquiring absentee lands in 1948 also placed it in charge of numerous religious endowments (*waqf*), which were tied to the confiscated lands. By 1965, Israel established local *waqf* boards, which gave Israeli-Arabs more control over *waqf* lands and their proceeds, but which also placed stringent restrictions on how the lands could be managed. By the 1980s, the administration of the *waqf* became a political issue due to allegations of corruption and mismanagement on the part of the *waqf* boards. It was discovered that some of these boards sold Islamic holy land and cemeteries to developers, which raised the ire of devout Muslims throughout Israel. Since the mid-1990s, due to political agitation, Israeli-Arabs have gained increasing control of their local *waqf* boards and a national level effort has been setup to find

documentation which will substantiate historic claims on traditional *waqf* lands not currently recognized by the Israeli government.⁴²

THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL

Secular Alternatives

The factors cited above show that many of the conditions that led to the rise of politically active Islamic revivals in many countries were also present in the state of Israel since its inception. The initial Israeli-Arab response to these conditions was, for the most part, a secular political development. Major works of scholarship on the Israeli-Arabs written prior to the mid-1980s do not mention Islam as a guiding principle for any of the various Israeli-Arab political movements that developed from 1948 to 1980. As late as 1985, Sammy Smooha, in his work, *Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, did not include an analysis on the leadership of the Islamic movement in Israel “because, at the time of the...surveys [on Israeli-Arab society] they were not politically visible.”⁴³ Elia Zureik, in 1979, cited only three major political reactions among the Israeli-Arabs – communists, nationalists, and intelligentsia – although he foreshadows the rise of the Israeli Islamic movement when he concludes the “weaknesses of...the elite was, and continues to be, its inability to establish an effective grass-roots political movement.”⁴⁴ A more comprehensive view of these pre-1980 Israeli-Arab political movements has developed over time in the works of political scientists such as Smooha and As’ad Ghanem. These political movements can be categorized into four major strands – accommodationists, reservationists, oppositionists, and nationalists (who, in their extreme form, are rejectionist in their outlook).⁴⁵ A brief review of each strand is necessary for illustrating how the Islamic movement in Israeli relates to the overall political consciousness of the Israeli-Arabs.

The accommodationists, reservationists, and oppositionist strands are all characterized by the belief that Israel has a legitimate right to exist and that Israeli-Arabs can function within the Israeli political system to secure their political goals, like any other minority in society. For the most part, accommodationists dominated Israeli-Arab politics through the late 1980s. Israeli-Arab politicians were members of existing Zionist parties, such as Labor and the Communist Party, and were principally rewarded for their support with a small number of Knesset seats, which gave the Israeli-Arabs a voice, albeit a small one, in deciding national issues. In the years prior to the 1967 war, this strand was supportive of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians but this changed over the course of the occupation. Most politicians of the Israeli-Arab strand now support a separate Palestinian homeland, along the lines of UN Resolution 181.

Beginning in the late-1980s, Israeli-Arabs began to form their own political parties, primarily led by Israeli-Arab MKs, and transitioned from what Smootha calls “accommodationists” into “reservationists” and “oppositionists.”⁴⁶ While both strands favor working within the system, parties such as the United Arab List (UAL) do not favor significant changes to the fundamental nature of the Israeli state, making them reservationists. Parties such as BALAD (the former Israeli-Arab communist party) and HADASH advocate creating a binational state in Israel with significant autonomy for the Israeli-Arabs, making them oppositionists.⁴⁷ These Arab parties also developed as a means of increasing the relative political power of the Israeli-Arabs. Negotiating as Arab parties, vice as individual MKs within a Zionist party, they can, theoretically, reap greater concessions from the main Zionist parties during the negotiations involved with forming a coalition government. These Israeli-Arab parties, currently four in number, now garner most of the Israeli-Arab votes, but their factional differences inhibit their ability to influence Israeli national politics.⁴⁸ Despite these differences, the prevailing view of these parties, as expressed by the leader of the Democratic Arab Party (DAP) MK Abdulwahab Darawshe, is that there is no “conflict between being a proud Palestinian Arab who is loyal to the Palestinian people and the Arab nation and being an Israeli citizen who is loyal to the state.”⁴⁹

The nationalist strand in Israeli-Arab politics has also, until recently, been a largely secular movement that seeks equality for the Palestinian people through the establishment of a truly democratic, secular state in the former Palestine or through the establishment of a Palestinian-controlled state. In some cases, advocates of this view work within the political framework but a segment of this strand believes in militant action to achieve its objectives and, in its most extreme form, rejects the legitimacy of the Israeli state. This group has a strong affinity with the Palestinian movement represented by what was formerly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).⁵⁰ While groups such as al-Ard were inspired by Nasserism in their nationalist views, current nationalist groups appear to be heavily influenced by their interaction with the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The most prominent of these groups has been the Sons of the Village (*Ibnaa al-Balad*) movement, which began in 1972 as grass-roots effort to instill Palestinian nationalism into the Israeli-Arabs. The Sons of the Village movement was closely allied with the PLO but in the 1980s a split occurred between those supporting Yasir Arafat’s Fatah organization and those supporting the more radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The more radical members of the movement still call for the abolishment of the Israeli state while the more moderate members are willing to work within the government as an oppositionist movement, evidenced by their formation of the National Democratic Alliance Party in 1996.⁵¹

Origins of the Islamic Movement

In his book, *Global Islamic Politics*, Mir Zohari Husain theorizes there are four main forms of Islamic political response that individuals have in reaction to the modern world: Pragmatists, who are comfortable with Western forms of government that separate church and state and largely see Islam as a personal religious choice or as just a part of their cultural identity; Modernists, who actively seek to adapt Western scientific and political theories to Islam; Traditionalist, who follow a dogmatic form of Islam and are normally apolitical; and Fundamentalists, who are typically anti-modernist in their outlook and seek to establish Islamic states guided by the *shari'a*, hoping to return to a “purer” form of Islam as it was practiced in the days of the Prophet.⁵² Up until the 1980s, Muslim’s in Israel primarily responded to their society as Pragmatists, Modernists, or Traditionalists, although Israeli-Arabs have remained the least secular of all the ethnic groups in Israel.⁵³ Still, all the factors that precipitated Islamic revival movements in other countries – socioeconomic inequalities, questions concerning the government’s legitimacy, lack of control over Islamic institutions, lack of political power, and rapid modernization – were all present in Israeli society. Given these factors were present since the inception of the Israeli state, the question remains why the Islamic movement in Israel was relatively late in its development when compared with similar movements in other countries. Various authors have listed other factors such as the decline of the Israeli Communist Party, which served as a major political outlet for the Israeli-Arabs, and the youth bulge of the 1970s and 80s, which produced a large, literate, and underemployed group of young Israeli-Arabs who were unable to assimilate fully into the larger society, as reasons that militated against the development of the Islamic revival in Israel until the early 1980s.⁵⁴

Most authors cite four events – the 1967 Israeli-Arab War, the Iranian Revolution, the *Hizballah* “victory” over the Israelis in southern Lebanon, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War – as key factors in the development of the Israeli Islamic revival movement and its increasing popularity throughout the 1980s and 90s. The most significant of these factors was the 1967 War. Following the war, Israel encouraged interaction between the Israeli-Arabs and the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, hoping “their Arabs” would act as a moderating influence in the occupied territories. Israeli-Arabs were allowed to study in Islamic universities, like those at Hebron and Nablus, where they became acquainted with the larger Islamic revival movement occurring throughout the world. A movement which held particular appeal to the Israeli-Arabs was that of the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt. Israeli-Arabs not only regained an appreciation for the holiness of Palestine in Islam but also came to appreciate the way Islamic nations and groups, such as the Muslim Brothers, had sacrificed for the Palestinians in their attempt to prevent Israel from forming in 1948.⁵⁵ The Iranian Revolution and the Israeli departure from southern Lebanon also

inspired the Israeli-Arabs for whom Islamic Fundamentalism was gaining appeal, as these events demonstrated the possibility of establishing an Islamic state and proved that the West, or at least its surrogates – the Shah and the Zionist Israeli government – could be defeated.⁵⁶ The Gulf War, indirectly, also had a significant impact. Due to their support for Iraq, many Palestinians were expelled from Arab countries allied with the United States (U.S.) in its coalition against Iraq. Many of these Palestinians made their new homes in the West Bank where they espoused the Islamic Fundamentalist viewpoints they had acquired during their time in other Arab countries. Given the larger number of Islamic Fundamentalists in the occupied territories, more Israeli-Arabs, not just the university students, were exposed to the revival movement through their everyday interactions with their ethnic brethren.⁵⁷

Although political Islam came to Palestine in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the 1930s, the start of the modern political Islamic movement in Israel is typically traced back to the late 1970s with the formation of the *Usrat al-Jihad* (The Family of Holy War).⁵⁸ The two main organizers of the movement were Ibrahim Abu Mukh and Shaykh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, both of whom went to universities in the West Bank. While Mukh was in his 40s, most of the other members of the *Usrat*, which never numbered more than 70, were young Israeli-Arab professionals and laborers. Over a two year period, from 1979 to 1981, the group clandestinely trained with weapons and destroyed economic and cultural targets, such as farms and cinemas, in the predominantly Israeli-Arab parts of Israel. Their goal was to motivate the people to adopt their view that Zionism and Western cultural values had no place in Muslim lands.⁵⁹ In 1981, the group was arrested by the Israelis, who believed the formation of the *Usrat* was an anomalous occurrence. Mukh and Darwish did four and two years of prison time, respectively, for their roles in the *Usrat* but, while in prison, they were allowed to proselytize to other inmates, which facilitated the spreading of their views throughout Israeli-Arab society.⁶⁰

Shaykh Darwish: From Radical to Pragmatist

Since many consider Shaykh Darwish to be the founder and spiritual leader of Israel's Islamic movement, a brief examination of his life and his transformation from a leader of the radical *Usrat al-Jihad* to the leader of the pragmatic "Young Muslim" movement is necessary to understand the state of the Islamic movement in Israel today. Shaykh Darwish was born in the village of Kafr Qassem, near Tel Aviv, a town historically significant to the Israeli-Arabs because it was the scene of a massacre in which 47 Israeli-Arab farmers were killed by Israeli security forces while returning from their fields in October of 1956. The farmers had not received word concerning the imposition of a curfew on the area around Kafr Qassem, which was the reason they were shot. Shaykh Darwish was a boy at the time

and, although he was returning from the fields with his uncle, he survived because the pack animal pulling the cart he was riding in bolted back to the village when the shooting started. His uncle was killed in the massacre and revenge became one of Darwish's goals.⁶¹ Shaykh Darwish's political education occurred during his involvement with the Israeli Communist Party but he eventually became a teacher, gaining his license to teach Islam in Nabulus in 1972. Reportedly a gifted lecturer, he gained many adherents but was removed from his teaching position in 1979 due to his advocacy for the creation of a Palestinian Islamic state.⁶² Shortly after this Shaykh Darwish sought to implement his ideas through the *Usrat al-Jihad* movement, detailed above, but this course of action did not have the desired effect on the Israeli-Arabs and led to his imprisonment.

Shaykh Darwish was released from prison in 1983 and he had a new vision for creating an Islamic revival movement in Israel. Rather than use violent means to obtain his objectives, which had moderated during his imprisonment, Darwish and his followers formed "Young Muslim" (*al-Shabab al-Muslim*) organizations in Israeli-Arab villages as a means of creating Islamic societies at the local level, ever mindful to work within the bounds of Israeli law.⁶³ The Young Muslim organizations were patterned on the Muslim Brotherhood founded by al-Banna. With the slogan "Islam is the solution," the Young Muslims, using funds from the *zakat* (tithe), Palestinian ex-patriots, and Arab countries sympathetic to their cause, enacted a far ranging series of religious, social, and political reforms in the communities where they were active. Promoting self-help projects to build esteem within their communities, the Young Muslims sought to correct decades of religious and social inequality in Israel by establishing their own mosques and building a comprehensive, Islamic-based social infrastructure – schools, libraries, clinics, newspapers, and gymnasiums. By working the seams in the Israeli social fabric, the Young Muslims gained grass-roots support, which has led to a decline in the influence of the "official" Islamic establishment in those areas where the movement predominates, this despite attempts on the part of the Israeli government to reform the Islamic institutions they administer.⁶⁴ Members of the movement are also actively involved in groups such as the National Islamic Association, which seeks to identify property belonging to Muslims prior to 1948 and challenges Israeli acquisition of these properties, particularly *waqf* lands, through the Israeli court system.⁶⁵ While begun by Shaykh Darwish, it is important to note that there is no formalized, national-level direction for the various Young Muslim organizations.⁶⁶ Although these organizations are loosely affiliated, each local community's Islamic revival movement pursues different goals depending on the views of its leadership.

Although not unified nationally, Islamic revival groups in Israel also share the common goal of implementing *shari'a* law in the areas under their control. To this end, local movement have become politically active. By 1989, they

made an impressive showing in local elections gaining five mayoral or chairmanship positions and 45 seats on 11 municipal councils. In 1993, they won control of six municipalities and gained 50 council seats.⁶⁷ Transitioning the movement beyond the local level has been difficult, however, as differences of opinion concerning participation of the movement's followers in national elections has created a split in the movement that remains in effect today and was clearly evident in the latest Knesset elections.

The Israeli Islamic Movement Since 1996: Division and Uncertainty

The relationship of the Israeli Islamic movement to the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority has been a source of division within the movement since the mid-1990s.⁶⁸ In 1993, Shaykh Darwish publicly voiced his support for the Oslo Accords and began to push the Islamic movement toward greater involvement in Israeli national politics. He also expressed a willingness to ally himself with Jewish parties who supported a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian issue through the establishment of a Palestinian state. Darwish also had contacts with MK Darawshe's DAP and believed this party, which had similar political goals with regard to Israeli-Arab equality and the Palestinian issue, could be allies of the Islamic movement on the local and national level. While some in the movement objected to participation in the Knesset elections, Darwish encouraged his followers to use their conscience (to practice *ijtihad*) in making their decision as to whether or not they should vote in the elections. While the success of the DAP on the national level was limited, gaining just two Knesset seats in the 1992 elections, it was significant in that it confirmed Arab parties in Israel were a viable means for the Israeli-Arab minority to obtain a voice in national affairs.⁶⁹

In 1996, a split in the Islamic movement occurred with the decision by Darwish to allow members of the movement to join with the DAP to form the United Arab List (UAL), which advocated establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, local Islamic control over the *waqf*, equality for the Israeli-Arabs in Israeli society, and *shari'a* courts independent of Israeli government influence. Darwish's move toward national political activism caused the movement to split into two factions. Darwish's faction cited *fatwas* that allowed Muslims to vote for candidates in the election, as long as those candidates were also Muslims.⁷⁰ The opposition, led by Shaykh Ra'id Salah of Umm al-Fahm, near Haifa, and Shaykh Kamal Khatib of Kafr Kanna, near Nazareth, argued the Knesset was not an Islamic institution. Salah and his supporters stated that active participation on a national level was a violation of Islam given the fact MKs were required to swear a loyalty oath to the State of Israel and involvement in the national government essentially condoned the administration of the *waqf* and Islamic institutions by non-Muslims.⁷¹ Despite this split, the UAL won four seats in the 1996 Knesset and five seats in the 1999 elections. In both elections, two of the UAL's seats

were set aside for members of Darwish's Southern Islamic movement. MK Abd al-Malik Dahamshah and MK Tawfiq Khatib became the first two members of the movement to sit in the Knesset.⁷²

By 1998, the Islamic movement had firmly split into Northern and Southern factions, led by Shaykhs Salah and Darwish, respectively. In that year, Shaykh Darwish resigned as head of the Southern Islamic movement and was succeeded by Ibrahim Sarsur, who also became the new head of the Kafr Qassem local council.⁷³ A protégé of Darwish and a spokesman for the Young Muslims, one of Sarsur's first acts following his selection as the Southern movement's leader was to perform a *Hajj* to Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah, a symbolic journey meant to signal Sarsur's strong commitment to Islam and his need to establish a set of credentials independent of those he derived from his association with Darwish.⁷⁴ In a 1998 interview, Sarsur praised Darwish for all he had accomplished through the Young Muslim movement but Sarsur also stated the movement required new leadership that could better advance the movement's objectives in a way that did not cause concern among the Jewish majority and which could better reconcile the split in the movement. Sarsur believed Darwish would become the spiritual leader of the movement following his resignation.⁷⁵ While it is questionable that Darwish has become the spiritual leader for the entire movement, he still remains an influential figure in the Israeli-Arab Muslim community, where he continues to advocate for unity in the Islamic movement and participation in the national government.⁷⁶ Under Sarsur's leadership, the Southern Islamic movement continues to participate in national elections and is seen as a moderate faction among the various Arab political movements.

Some analysts contend that Salah's Northern Islamic movement in Israel has actually gained more adherents in recent years and there are concerns in Israel about its relationship to the more radical and violent factions in the Palestinian independence movement, such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).⁷⁷ In 2002, Israeli news services leaked a secret government report that characterized the Israeli Islamic movement as a threat which seeks "to achieve illegitimate objectives through legitimate means...[by]...infiltrating the crack left by the Israeli administration by providing health, welfare, and education services."⁷⁸ The Israeli government was quick to assure the public the report did not represent the official government position, so the response to the report was muted. The report was also highly critical of Shaykh Salah, characterizing him as a ribald anti-Zionist whose main goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in Israel.⁷⁹ Salah's high public profile and popularity make him a natural target of the Israeli government's attention given their concerns over Palestinian terrorism. Like Darwish, Shaykh Salah has strong credentials within the Israeli-Arab and Palestinian Islamic communities, particularly through his support to organizations that seek the restoration and preservation of *waqf* property and his active involvement in a long standing renovation project at the al-

Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.⁸⁰ While not denying Israel's right to exist, Salah is known to advocate the establishment of an Islamic, Palestinian state in places within Israeli and the occupied territories that contain a Muslim majority.⁸¹ In an editorial he wrote in the weekly Umm al-Fahm newspaper, *Voice of Truth and Freedom (Sawt al-Haqq wa-l'-Hurriyya)*, which is run by members of the Northern Islamic movement, Salah stated he was primarily concerned with local politics. Salah advocates supplying social services as a means of addressing the physical and spiritual needs of the people. He does not believe the Islamic movement should be focused on gaining political power and only targets for political action those Israeli-Arab areas that are not run by "good" governments (by which he presumably means governments that allow the Islamic movement free reign to service the community).⁸²

The question remains whether Salah's advocacy of an Islamic Palestinian state and his desire to "strengthen contacts with our Arab world, Islamic nation, and human environment" has translated into active support for Palestinian terrorist factions.⁸³ In a January 2003 interview, PIJ leader Ramadan Abdallah Shallah stated that, while he had never met Salah, he was aware of many contacts between the PIJ and Israeli-Arabs. Furthermore, Shallah commented that, even though the PIJ did not have a presence in Israeli-Arab areas "in the broad organizational sense," he was familiar with "a current there that sympathizes with" the PIJ.⁸⁴ Shallah also contends that Israeli-Arabs act as facilitators for *fedayeen* attacks, providing critical logistical and intelligence support.⁸⁵ While it is likely there are Israeli-Arabs who passively support the Palestinian terrorist movements and, while there are documented cases of individual Israeli-Arabs facilitating terrorist actions in Israeli, it is problematic to conclude this support is as widespread as Shallah contends. Shaykh Hashim Abd-al-Rahman, the spokesman for the Northern Islamic movement, has stated their support of the Palestinians in the occupied territories has been political and humanitarian, emphatically insisting the Northern Islamic movement "work(s) within the law and do [sic] not break the law because we see protection in the law from those who do not wish us to be in this country [Israel]."⁸⁶ While members of the Northern Islamic movement may covertly provide support to Palestinian terrorist groups, the overt policies and practices of the movement, which is exceedingly careful to remain within the boundaries of the law, are consistent with Rahman's public statements. Most likely Shallah exaggerates the support his organization receives from the Israeli-Arabs to play on Israeli fears, hoping this would result in increased discrimination or outright repression of the Israeli-Arabs by the Israeli government, thus creating conditions that may induce more Israeli-Arabs to choose a radical path.

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE ISRAELI ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

Increased Radicalization: The al-Aqsa Intifada

Ariel Sharon's visit to the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem on 29 September 2000 was the trigger that initiated the second major *intifada* (uprising) among the Palestinians of the occupied territories. To show support for the Palestinians of the occupied territories, the Israeli-Arabs, particularly those individuals in areas where the Islamic movement was strongest, participated in a general strike and also began a series of demonstrations that lasted for the first two weeks of October 2000. While the immediate cause of the demonstrations was the al-Aqsa incident, the reaction of the Israeli-Arabs gave vent to their long standing grievances with the Israeli state.⁸⁷ In some cases, these demonstrations devolved into clashes with Israeli security services. In the first two weeks of October, Israeli responses to the demonstrations led to the deaths of thirteen Israeli-Arabs with close to 1,000 wounded. Additionally, press reports indicate that Israeli security forces in some areas allowed anti-Arab vigilantes to abuse the property of Israeli-Arabs.⁸⁸ As tensions subsided, the government of Ehud Barak ordered an inquiry into the matter, an inquiry that was unique in the fact it was conducted by an independent panel of fourteen Jewish and eleven Israeli-Arab academics. The panel's report was an indictment of Israel's policies toward its Arab minority, detailing the systematic economic, social, cultural, legal, and political discrimination that existed in Israel. The panel made numerous recommendations to redress these issues, to include: increased funding for Israeli-Arab social programs and economic development, the institution of affirmative action policies, compensation for confiscated land, granting autonomy to Israeli-Arab schools, and better training for security forces to prevent acts of police brutality.⁸⁹

Very few of the recommendations listed above have been implemented and it appears unlikely they will be enacted under a Likud-led coalition government. It is also unclear whether the damage done by the Israeli reaction to "their Arabs" moral support to the al-Aqsa Intifada can be undone in the near term. As Abdullah El-Ashaal, an Egyptian assistant Foreign Minister has lamented, the events of October 2000 have been "opportunistically exploited [by both Israeli-Arabs and Jews]...with the result that the experience of coexistence and assimilation gained over 50 years has been...seriously eroded."⁹⁰ MK Azmi Bishara, of the Israeli-Arab BALAD party, stated the feelings of many Israeli-Arabs when he said "what happened in October [2000] has struck a fatal blow to the integration thesis for the great majority of Israel's Arabs."⁹¹ While the Islamic movement still works within the law to affect change in the Israeli system, some of their members are no longer content with non-violent methods. In September 2001, an Israeli-Arab Islamic movement member was involved in an attack in the town of Nahariya. In August 2002, Israeli-Arabs

acted as facilitators in the Meron Junction bus bombing.⁹² While these may appear to be isolated data points, it is likely the new Sharon government may be more right-wing than the previous government and, therefore, even less likely to institute reform measures that could alleviate the tensions by redressing the issues that led to the increased radicalization of these individuals. If tensions increase, there are those, like the PIJ leader Shallah, who will be willing to exploit those tensions for their ends. In Shallah's view, the Israeli-Arabs value is their status as Israeli citizens, which he believes constrains the limits of Israeli repression against them. To Shallah, allowing a willing Israeli-Arab to sacrifice himself in a suicide attack would be a waste as just one individual can enable numerous attacks "without generating new pressure on our kinsfolk [the Israeli-Arabs]."⁹³ If the Sharon government increases its repression on the Palestinians in the occupied territories and ignores the grievances of the Israeli-Arabs, it will most likely create the situation the Israeli's have feared most with regard to their Arab minority – an active "fifth column" movement with ties to Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups operating within the Israeli polity.

National Political Apathy and Rejection: The 2003 Knesset Elections

While the worst case scenario mentioned above has not yet occurred, the recent Knesset elections point to another troubling trend that make it more likely – the general apathy toward the national elections expressed by the Israeli-Arabs. For the majority, this political apathy is most likely a passive reaction to the years of discrimination and the dashed expectations that were raised by the promise of the Oslo Accords and the relative success of the Arab parties in the 1990s. Their second class status, highlighted by the Israeli response to their support of the al-Aqsa Intifada, has given many Israeli-Arabs the sense there is little they can do to change their situation through national politics, as they will always remain a minority.⁹⁴ Another factor in this political apathy is the lack of a unified Israeli-Arab leadership. Despite the fact polls show Israeli-Arabs are distressed by the lack of unity among the Israel's Arab political parties, four separate Arab parties participated in the January 2003 Knesset elections.⁹⁵ Although the BALAD party received a small bounce due to controversies surrounding the attempts by the Israeli Attorney General to have their leading MK, Azmi Bishara, excluded from the elections due to his contacts with radical Palestinian nationalist groups, the other Arab parties lost seats in the Knesset with the UAL, supported by Darwish's faction of the Islamic movement, losing three seats, the biggest loss for any of the Arab parties. Overall, the Arab parties dropped from ten to eight seats in the Knesset as a result of the recent elections and none of the Zionist parties intend to seat an Arab MK.⁹⁶

In addition to this passive apathy toward the elections, both the secular Sons of the Village movement and Salah's Northern Islamic movement called for a boycott of the election. While Salah concedes that the Arabs in the

Knesset are doing the best they can, he still believes there is little they can do for the majority of Israeli-Arabs on a national level given their lack of power in the system. Despite years in the Knesset, little has change for the Israeli-Arabs, in Salah's view, as Israeli still has control over the *waqf*, confiscates land, destroys Israeli-Arab houses, and discriminates against its minorities.⁹⁷ Shaykh Darwish actively opposed the boycott, arguing that participation in the election was in accordance with *shari'a* and represented the only chance to influence Israeli law.⁹⁸ As a symbol of Darwish's declining influence, the Arab voter turnout was the lowest for any Knesset election in Israel's history, indicating that many Israeli-Arabs feel disconnected from national politics.⁹⁹ While most analysts have attributed the low Israeli-Arab voter turnout to political apathy, at least one commentator has seen the results as a win for Salah's Northern Islamic movement as there is a perception that the boycott he called for had an affect on many of the voters.¹⁰⁰

The election was a major victory for Likud and other right-wing parties, who now hold 67 of the 120 Knesset.¹⁰¹ As expected, those supporting the cause of Palestinian nationalism roundly denounced the elections as a victory for the repressive elements in Israeli society and politics. The general mood is not optimistic concerning the prospects for peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis given that major opposition parties, like Labor, which is perceived as more inclined to work on a solution to the dispute, appear unwilling to join Likud's government.¹⁰² Coincident with the Israeli elections, an Egyptian sponsored conference to promote unity among the various Palestinian factions ended in late January without a final statement, a clear indication that divisions still remain among the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, Hamas, the PIJ, and other Palestinian political groups.¹⁰³ The failure of this conference, whose goal was to develop a unified Palestinian response to the new Israeli government, is important because the factionalism apparent in the occupied territories has been reflected in the Israeli Islamic movement, with the Southern Islamic movement supporting Fatah and the Northern Islamic movement supporting Hamas and the PIJ. Since the elections, Shaykh Salah has continued to emphasize his sympathies for the more radical elements of the worldwide Islamic Fundamentalist movement. Taking advantage of Israeli-Arabs reaction to the right-wing victory and the popularity of his boycott movement in the area around Umm al-Fahm, Salah staged a large demonstration in the wake of the elections, ostensibly in opposition to the possibility of a U.S. war against Iraq. Employing rhetoric reminiscent of other radical Islamic Fundamentalist movements, Salah used this opportunity to castigate other Muslims and Arab countries for their lack of support and faith in the Palestinian cause. He also expressed vehement opposition to the U.S., urging Muslims to "purge every U.S. embassy and banish them all from the Islamic and Arab world."¹⁰⁴

PROSPECTS

As evidenced above, the Islamic movement in Israel is divided into two major factions and the potential for compromise between them seems dim. While both factions support the establishment of a Palestinian state, seek greater control of local Islamic institutions and the restoration of the *waqf*, and provide needed religious, social, and welfare services to the villages and towns where they are active, these groups are deeply divided over their role in Israeli society. The Southern movement is accommodationist and moderate, seeking to make progress on their issues through active participation in Israeli politics at all levels. The Northern movement, which appears to be in ascendance, is rejectionist in its outlook, denying the legitimacy of any non-Islamic state, Zionist or otherwise, to have influence on the Islamic way of life. Recent trends – the Israeli reaction to the Israeli-Arabs' support for the al-Aqsa Intifada, increasing ties between Israeli Northern Islamic movement members and radical Palestinian factions like the PIJ, isolated instances of Israeli-Arabs participating in or assisting with terrorist attacks against Israel, an inability on the part of the Israeli government to resolve long standing grievances, the election of a right-wing majority to the Knesset, political apathy on the part of the Israeli-Arabs, and increasingly vitriolic rhetoric from the leader of the Northern Israeli Islamic leader, Shaykh Salah – are troubling. If these trends continue, it is likely more members of the Northern Islamic movement will engage in or facilitate terrorist actions in Israel due to their frustrations with a state in which they are unlikely to ever attain the type of social equality and justice prized by their religion. Resolving the question of how to deal with the demands of the Israeli Islamic movement in a Zionist state will be a major test for the State of Israel, especially given current demographic trends, which indicate the percentage of Israeli-Arabs in the population will continue to grow relative to the Jewish majority. The tension which has always characterized Israel's dual nature as a democracy and Zionist state is brought out clearly by Israeli policy toward its Arab minority. Political Islam constitutes a major challenge to the Israeli polity. Israel can choose to accommodate the Islamic movement to a greater extent than it has. While this would be keeping faith with its democratic nature it would eventually pose an increasing challenge to Zionism. Conversely, Israel can continue on a course that discriminates against its Arab minority, a course that may lead to greater repression of this group, which could drive more of its members to actively support or directly engage in terrorism. While this course would uphold the Zionist ideal, it would come at great expense to Israel's perception of itself as a democracy. Given the current trends in Israeli national politics, it appears the Zionist strand in the Israeli polity will remain dominant in the near term. Given the trends in the Israeli Islamic movement cited above, it is very likely tensions between the Israeli Islamic movement and the Israeli government will continue to increase and further violent clashes, like those that occurred in October 2000, will become more common in Israel.

CONCLUSION

The Islamic movement in Israel can be seen as an integral part of the global Islamic revival movement that began to gain strength throughout the Islamic world in the latter half of the 20th century. Like movements in other countries, it has its roots in a number of factors endemic to the developing world in the post-colonial period and it followed a path of development broadly similar to other Islamic movements. What makes the movement unique is its interaction with the State of Israel, a democratic Zionist state, and the Palestinian movement. Interestingly, Israel's official response to Islam was similar to the approach of Islamic nations, like Egypt, in that the Israeli government took control of Islamic institutions, which ultimately resulted in a loss of legitimacy for these "official" Islamic institutions in the eyes of the *umma*. Like the movements in other countries, it is not monolithic, and two competing strands of political Islam – one accommodationist and moderate, the other rejectionist and more radical – have emerged in Israel. With origins in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, both factions share common elements with regard to their beliefs and, in the areas under their control, they have pushed the limits of Israeli law to establish a limited form of autonomous local Islamic government. Major differences exist within the factions concerning participation in national elections and their support to the various Palestinian factions that operate in the occupied territories. Since the prospects for significant reform in Israeli Islamic policy are low given the success of the right-wing in Israeli national politics, it is likely the Islamic movement in Israel will become more radical over time, a development which will severely test Israel's commitment to its democratic principles.

NOTES

¹ For the purposes of this paper, Israeli-Arabs are a subset of the Palestinian ethnic group formed by the descendants of the Palestinians who stayed within the territory claimed and administered by Israel following the 1948 war to establish the state of Israel. Israeli-Arabs, who number from 900,000 to 1 million individuals (17-20percent of the Israeli population) are primarily concentrated in the northern Israeli province of Galilee (60 percent) with other large concentrations in the central “Triangle” area between Haifa and Tel Aviv (20percent), and the southern Al-Naqab area (10percent). The remaining 10 percent are located in various “mixed-cities” (Acre, Haifa, Leda, Ramle, Yaffa, Jerusalem). There are 107 Israeli-Arab municipalities in Israel. Israeli-Arabs can be further divided by their religious affiliation: Muslims constitute 75 percent of the population, Christians - 14 percent, and Druze - 11 percent. While still ethnically and culturally tied to the main body of Palestinians who live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the countries bordering Israel, the Israeli-Arabs form an ethnic subgroup as many have assimilated some Israeli social and cultural norms that demographically make them unique among the Palestinians and the larger Arab ethnic group. For additional information see As’ad Ghanem, *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001) 1-3; and Mir Zohair Husain, *Global Islamic Politics* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995) 137-138.

² K. J. Asali, “Jerusalem in History: Notes on the Origins of the City and its Traditions of Tolerance,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 42-43; and Abdallah El-Khatib, “Jerusalem in the Qur’an,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 28, no. 1 (May 2001): 26-28, 31.

³ Asali, 30-32.

⁴ El-Khatib, 39.

⁵ Asali, 39-40.

⁶ Thomas W. Lippman, *Understanding Islam*, (New York: Meridian, 1995), 109-111, 128-132.

⁷ At least one author has traced the origins of the movement back as far as the mid-nineteenth century and points to 1905, when Palestinian leaders expressed concerns to the Ottoman sultan about the influx of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, as the beginning of formal expressions by the Palestinians of a national identity. Most authors trace the movement’s origins back to the start of the British mandate period, which marks the beginning of the activist stage in the Palestinian’s desire for statehood. See Elia T. Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 38-39, cited hereafter as Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*; Jacob M. Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967-1991* (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1993), 5; Ghanem, 12, 95; and Jamal R. Nassar, “The Culture of Resistance: The 1967 War in the Context of the Palestinian Struggle,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 78.

⁸ From 1919 to 1936, the percentage of the Jewish population in Palestine rose from 9.7 percent to 29.5 percent, largely due to the immigration of the Ashkenazi (European Jews) into Palestine. These immigrants, who were able to draw on significant financial resources from Europe, soon came to dominate the economy of Palestine and aggressively acquired land, forcing a dislocation of Palestinian peasants who, uprooted and transplanted into unfamiliar urban environments, felt alienated and desired a return to a more traditional social structure. For additional details see Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel* 37-47 and Ghanem 12-13.

⁹ Ghanem, 12.

¹⁰ Shaykh Qassam is still revered by Palestinian’s, who see him as a symbol of and martyr to their cause. Nassar, 78.

¹¹ Ghanem, 12-15.

¹² The “Plan of Partition with Economic Union” called for a division of Palestine as follows – 56% to the Jewish people and 46% to the Palestinians with the city of Jerusalem and its surrounding environs (the remaining 1%) designated an international zone under UN control. The plan called for an economic union between the divided states and mandated that each state would adopt a constitution that fully guaranteed the civil and political rights of its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity or national background. Had the partition plan been implemented, Palestinians would have made up 49 percent of the population in the Jewish state. For additional information see “United Nations Resolution 181,” 28 November 1947, *Palestinian Center*, URL:< <http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/resolution181.html#footnote02>>, accessed 8 February 2003; Ghanem, 13, 15; and Nassar, 79-80.

¹³ The two main Arab armies were the Liberation Army (*Jaish al-Enqad*) formed by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and the Army of the Sacred Jihad (*Jaish al-Jihad al-Muqadas*) formed by one of the main Palestinian clan factions. Rivalries and suspicions hindered cooperation among these forces. For additional information see Ghanem, 15-16; and Nassar 80-81.

¹⁴ Although the Palestinians did form a government in the Gaza Strip following the war, it was largely ineffective and was disbanded by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1959. In 1952, the distribution of the Palestinian population was as follows – Israel – 11 percent, Gaza Strip – 18 percent, West Bank – 47 percent, neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt) – 21 percent, elsewhere – 3 percent. For additional information see Sammy Smootha, *Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, vol 2 of *Arabs and Jews in Israel*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1992), 8; Ghanem 11-12, 16; and Husain, 189.

¹⁵ Smootha, 1.

¹⁶ Three excellent works of scholarship that discuss these patterns and trends in great detail are Husain’s *Global Islamic Politics* (cited above); John L Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Giles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002).

¹⁷ Ahmad H. Sa’di states the term “ethnic democracy” was coined by the sociologist Sammy Smootha (mentioned above). An ethnic democracy “combine[s] the extension of political and civil rights to individuals and certain collective rights to minorities with institutional dominance of the state by one of the ethnic groups...minorities will be...disadvantaged but...can avail themselves of democratic means to negotiate better terms of coexistence.” - Ahmad H. Sa’di “Israel as Ethnic Democracy: What Are the Implications for the Palestinian Minority?” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 25. For a more detailed explanation of Smootha’s ethnic democracy concept, see his work *Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, vol 2 of *Arabs and Jews in Israel*, cited above.

¹⁸ Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel* 118.

¹⁹ Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Cultural Pluralism and the Israeli Nation-Building Ideology,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no. 4 (November 1995): 461-482. For detailed studies that use extensive demographic data to show that Israeli-Arabs have been, and continue to be, discriminated against socially, economically, politically, and culturally in Israel see Smootha’s *Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, vol 2 of *Arabs and Jews in Israel*; Zureik’s *The Palestinians in Israel*, Landau’s, *The Arab Minority in Israel*, and Ghanem’s *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel*, all cited above.

²⁰ Smootha, 13-16; and Uri Davis, “*Jinsiyya* Versus *Muwatana*: The Question of Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: The Cases of Israel, Jordan and Palestine,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 1, 2 (Winter, Spring 1995): 21-27.

²¹ Ghanem, 19-20.

²² Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel* 172-175.

²³ Ghanem, 21-26; 40-42.

²⁴ Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel, 1948-93," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 3 (August 1996): 401-403. In addition to limits on political expression, Israelis can also be stripped of their citizenship for actions that "violate trust with the state." This power was used most recently in September 2002 in the case of an Israeli-Arab who facilitated a Hamas terrorist attack. See Mazal Mualem, "Interior Minister Revokes Citizenship of Israeli Arab," GMP20020909000141 Tel Aviv *Ha'arets*, 1354 GMT (09 September 2002), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003.

²⁵ Hayim Shibi, "Liberman: 'Citizenship to Arabs Only If They Declare Allegiance'," GMP20021217000163 Tel Aviv *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, (17 December 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003.

²⁶ Osama Fouad Khalifa, "Arab Political Mobilization and Israeli Responses," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15-16; and Davis, 24-25.

²⁷ Davis, 31. For additional information see Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel* 118; Elia Zureik, "Being Palestinian in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 89-90, cited hereafter as Zureik, "Being Palestinian in Israel"; and Ruchama Marton, "A View from Within: Problems Confronting Human Rights Organizations in Israel and the Occupied Territories," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 41.

²⁸ Yoav Peled and Shafir, 403-404.

²⁹ Zureik, "Being Palestinian in Israel," 90, 92-93.

³⁰ Ghanem, 3-4; Khalifa, 20-22; and "Budget Allocated for Development of Arab Sector Amounts to 6.5 percent of the Government Budget for Development," GMP20021128000240 Nazareth *Kull al-Arab*, (22 November 2002), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003.

³¹ Cohen-Almagor, 465, 470-477.

³² Ghanem, 2-3, 13, 21-26.

³³ Uri Ash, "Coexistence Proves Elusive in Galilee," GMP20020910000199 Tel Aviv *Ha'arets*, (10 September 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003; Zayid Khanifas, "Right-Wing Student Organization in Technion Seeks To Prevent Arab Students from Studying 'Sensitive' Scientific Subjects," GMP20021216000217 Nazareth *Al-Sinnarah*, (04 December 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003; and Peter Kenyon, "Profile: Israeli Response to Arab Israeli Voices It Claims Are Threatening Its Democracy," 14 January 2003, *Morning Edition, National Public Radio*, URL:<<http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2003/jan/030114.kenyon.html>>, accessed 02 February 2003..

³⁴ Ihsan Bakr, "Arab Knesset Members on Peace, Israel," JN3010180398 London *Al-Hayah*, (25 October 1998), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003.

³⁵ Cohen-Almagor, 464, 477-479.

³⁶ Sa'di, 28.

³⁷ Sami Shalom Chetrit, "Mizrahi Politics in Israel: Between Integration and Alternative," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 51.

³⁸ Some of the policies instituted by Nasser and his successor, Anwar Sadat, included state sponsorships of mosques, appointment of *imams* (prayer leaders), state control of Islamic education (such as *al-Azhar* University), and attempts to use moderate Islamic societies to counter the influence of more radical groups. This cooption of the *ulema* and Islamic institutions is seen as major factor in the rise of Islamic revival movements and political Islam as the majority of believers saw the state run Islamic institutions, which supported state policy, as anathema to the spirit of their religion, which believes Islam should determine state policy, not work as a tool for it. For additional information see Kepel, 50-53, 65-69, 81-83; and Esposito, 93-100.

³⁹ Alisa Rubin Peled, "Towards Autonomy? The Islamist Movement's Quest for Control of Islamic Institutions in Israel," *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 389; and Landau 26-27.

⁴⁰ Alisa Rubin Peled, 380-389; and Landau, 27-28.

⁴¹ Alisa Rubin Peled, 380-389.

⁴² Landau, 27-28; and Alisa Rubin Peled, 386-388.

⁴³ Smootha, 24.

⁴⁴ Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel* 186-187.

⁴⁵ Smootha, 10-11; and Ghanem, 39, 50-58, 96-102.

⁴⁶ Smootha, 10; and Ghanem, 39, 50-58;

⁴⁷ "The Parties," n.d., *Ha'aretz*, URL:<[http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/ShArtElection.jhtml?itemNo243794&contrassID=28?????](http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/ShArtElection.jhtml?itemNo243794&contrassID=28?????>)>, accessed 02 February 2003.

⁴⁸ Ilyas Karam, "Mutagim Institute Poll Shows There Are Four Main Arab Lists: RA'AM, BALAD, HADASH, and Arab Movement for Renewal," GMP20021128000237 Nazareth *Kull al-Arab*, (22 November 2002), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003; Ya'ir Ettinger, "Arab Parties Fail to Find National Unity," GMP 20021213000080 Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, (13 December 2002), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003, cited hereafter as Ettinger, "Arab Parties"; and Ya'ir Ettinger, "Abyss Widening Between Jewish and Arab Parties," GMP20030130000165 Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, (30 January 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003, cited hereafter as Ettinger, "Abyss."

⁴⁹ Ghanem, 52.

⁵⁰ Nassar, 82-83; Smootha, 11; and Ghanem, 121-122.

⁵¹ Ghanem 100-102; and Smootha, 11.

⁵² Husain, 1-26.

⁵³ Smootha, 41-44.

⁵⁴ Alisa Rubin Peled, 381; and Kepel, 65-69.

⁵⁵ Landau, 37-39; Alisa Rubin Peled, 379-380; and Smootha, 7.

⁵⁶ Alisa Rubin Peled, 380-381; and Husain, 191.

⁵⁷ Husain, 194.

⁵⁸ Ghanem, 123-124; and Nachman Tal, "The Islamic Movement in Israel," *Strategic Assessment* 2, no. 4. (February 2000), *Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Tel Aviv University*, URL:<<http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v2n4p5.html>>, accessed 02 February 2003. Tal's conclusions concerning the Islamic Movement's ultimate aims are not persuasive, given an evident bias in his study against the Islamic movement in Israel. The facts he uses to make his argument, when cited in this paper, have been verified using other sources.

⁵⁹ Alisa Rubin Peled, 381-382.

⁶⁰ Landau, 39; and Alisa Rubin Peled, 382.

⁶¹ Rees, Matt, "Where to Now?," *Time*, 19 August 2002, URL:< http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/from_redirect/0,10987,1101020819-335996,00.html>, accessed 31 January 2003.

⁶² Alisa Rubin Peled, 382.

⁶³ Ghanem, 124; and Alisa Rubin Peled, 382.

⁶⁴ Landau, 39-41; Ghanem, 125-133; Alisa Rubin Peled, 378, 383, 389-394; Smootha, 98; and Tal.

⁶⁵ Alisa Rubin Peled, 379, 388.

⁶⁶ In 1981, it was estimated that up to 20 percent of the youth in most Muslim villages in Israel belonged to Young Muslim organizations. While firm numbers for the percentage of the Israeli-Arabs belonging to Islamic movements were not available from the sources examined for this paper, it is probable the percentage of Israeli-Arab Muslims who would identify themselves with the Islamic revival movement remains between 10 to 20 percent of the population. For additional information see Landau, 40-41.

⁶⁷ Alisa Rubin Peled, 383-384; Landau, 40-41; and Smootha, 212.

⁶⁸ While the Young Muslim movement is a significant part of the Islamic revival in Israel, the more general term "Islamic movement" will be used to describe Islamic revival movement in Israel for the remainder of this paper as this broader term encompasses the various factions within the movement.

⁶⁹ Ghanem, 42, 133; Alisa Rubin Peled, 385; and Tal.

⁷⁰ Alisa Rubin Peled, 385.

⁷¹ Ghanem 124, 133-134; and Yosef Elgazi, "Whither the Islamic Movement," TA0608110698 Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, (6 August 1998), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003.

⁷² Ghanem, 124; Elgazi; and Tal.

⁷³ Elgazi.

⁷⁴ Arye Dayan, "Local Islamic Leader Profile," TA1209132898 Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, (11 September 1998), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003; and Landau, 41-42.

⁷⁵ Dayan.

⁷⁶ Shaykh Abdullah Nimr Darwish, "Are Knesset Elections Prohibited by Shari'a or Are They a Disgrace?," GMP20030102000102 Nazareth *Kull al-Arab*, (27 December 2002), accessed on Intelink, 3 February 2003.

⁷⁷ Some analysts, like Nachman Tal, point to incidents like the 1992 murder of Israeli soldiers in Kibbutz Gal-Ed and the 1999 car bombings in Haifa and Tiberias as evidence of the active involvement by members of Israel's Islamic Movement in terrorist actions. Despite the inherent biases in his study, Tal does attempt to introduce some balance to his work by citing the fact Shaykh Darwish has always been quick to condemn Palestinian terrorism while the media organ of Salah's Northern Islamic movement, the weekly paper *Voice of Truth and Freedom (Sawt al-Haqq wa-l'-Hurriyya)*, often contains articles expressing understanding for the reasons terrorist acts were committed against Israelis. *Sawt* was shut down for a three month period in 1989 for "endangering public safety" and as recently as December 2002 the government has sought to shut down the newspaper for a two year period, once again citing endangerment to public safety as a concern. For additional information see Tal; and Alisa Rubin Peled, 384-385.

⁷⁸ Dayan.

⁷⁹ Dayan.

- ⁸⁰ Elgazi.
- ⁸¹ Alisa Rubin Peled, 385; and Ra'id Salah, "We and the Elections," GMP20021203000090 Umm al-Fahm Sawt al-Haqq wa al-Hurriyah, (29 November 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003.
- ⁸² Salah.
- ⁸³ Salah.
- ⁸⁴ Ghassan Shirbil, "Interview with Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Abdallah Shallah," GMP20030111000059 London *Al-Hayah*, (11 January 2003), accessed on Intelink, 3 February 2003.
- ⁸⁵ Shirbil.
- ⁸⁶ "Iqra Program Debates Role of Israeli Arabs in Supporting Intifadah," GMP20021210000199 Jeddah *Iqra Satellite TV Channel*, 1900 GMT (09 December 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003.
- ⁸⁷ Azmi Bishara, "Reflections on October 2000: A Landmark in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 57-59, 64; and Khalifa, 22-23.
- ⁸⁸ Zureik, "Being Palestinian in Israel," 88; Bishara, 54-55; and Martin Asser, "Israel's Arabs: Enemies Within?," 3 December 2001, *British Broadcasting Company News*, URL:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in-depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians_/issues/96????>, accessed 02 February 2003.
- ⁸⁹ Zureik, "Being Palestinian in Israel," 88-94.
- ⁹⁰ Abdullah El-Ashaad, "Stuck in the Middle," GMP20030202000234 Cairo *Al-Ahram Weekly*, (30 January 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003.
- ⁹¹ Bishara, 59.
- ⁹² Ash.
- ⁹³ Shirbil.
- ⁹⁴ Barbara Plett, "Israeli Arabs Struggle to Fit In," 26 January 2003, *British Broadcasting Company News*, URL:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2691357.stm>, accessed 31 January 2003.
- ⁹⁵ Ettinger, "Arab Parties."
- ⁹⁶ Barukh Kra, "AG requests disqualification of Azmi Bishara's Balad List," GMP20021219000149 Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, 1249 GMT (19 December 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003; Ya'ir Ettinger, "BALAD Launches 'International Campaign' To Fight Its Disqualification" GMP200212190001777 Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, (19 December 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003; "Profile: Israel's Arab Voice," *British Broadcasting Company News*, 9 January 2003, URL:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2642137.stm>, accessed 02 February 2003; Ettinger, "Abyss"; and "Elections for the 16th Knesset: Results," 28 January 2003, *The Israeli Knesset*, URL:<<http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections16/eng/results/Regions.asp>>, accessed 02 February 2003, cited hereafter as "Elections."
- ⁹⁷ Salah; and "Yes to Boycotting the Elections; We Will Not Bestow Legitimacy on a Racist Establishment," GMP20021128000193 *Sons of the Country*, (November 2002), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003.
- ⁹⁸ Darwish

⁹⁹ Ettinger, "Abyss"; and David Rudge, "Arab Parties Urged to Close Ranks," GMP20030130000152 Jerusalem *The Jerusalem Post*, (30 January 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003. Rudge states the Israeli-Arab turnout dropped from 78 percent of eligible voters in the 1999 Knesset elections to 68 percent in the 2003 elections.

¹⁰⁰ Rudge; and Yosef Algazy, "Hashim Mahamid Cost Us 20,000 Votes," GMP20030203000057 Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, (03 February 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003.

¹⁰¹ "Elections."

¹⁰² "PFLP Comments on Israeli Election Results," GMP20030129000230 Ramallah *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine*, (29 January 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003; Rudge; "Likud Victory Anticipated Albeit Not As Overwhelmingly," GMP20030130000085 Jerusalem *Al-Quds*, (30 January 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003; Mu'in Halabi, "Interview with Israeli Defense Minister Benyamin Ben Eli'ezer," GMP20020909000133 Nazareth *Kull al-Arab*, (06 September 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003; Ilyas Karam, "Interview with Labor MK Tzali Reshef," GMP20021205000089 Nazareth *Kull al-Arab*, (29 November 2002), accessed on Intelink, 23 January 2003; and Zuhayr Andrawus, "Israel Chooses War," GMP20030131000083 Nazareth *Kull al-Arab*, (31 January 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003.

¹⁰³ Jihan al-Husayni, "Interview with Khalid Mish'al, Chairman of the Islamic Resistance Movement's, HAMAS, Political Bureau," GMP20030131000044 London *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, (31 January 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003.

¹⁰⁴ Galal Banna, "Thousands Attend Islamic Movement Demonstration Against War in Iraq," GMP20030202000095 Tel Aviv *Ha'aretz*, (02 February 2003), accessed on Intelink, 03 February 2003.

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